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Furthermore, there are also conflicts when it comes to competitions. The reason a chess player has to do what will checkmate her opponent is similar to Nagel’s example of a boxing match in chapter 13. This is an example of a valuable competition and suppressed reasons. Some activities, such as chess, boxing, or other competitions, is intrinsically antagonistic. In the case of chess, each player has a reason to make the other player lose. This reason is clearly subjective because each player is acting upon their own personal interest of winning the match. The problem is that both competitors have the same reason of defeating each other, and this can’t be that either can bring about that one must be defeated. The objective reason for the competition is that it requires that each person suppress the reasons to which one must defeat the other. However, if this is the case, then it ruins the whole purpose of having a competition.
Lastly, the reason A has not to torture B as a way of preventing C’s torture of D and E. This is similar to the idea of freeing the slaves. Being a slave is terrible, and abolishing it would give the certainty that if I would end up on the bottom, things will still be good for me since I can’t be a slave anymore. This is the principle of maximizing. This is very subjective because it act upon our interest of making sure that if the worst happens, we would try as much as possible for the things to be good. With regards to the earlier reason, if A’s reason not to torture B is to prevent D and E’s torture, it is subjective as long as A’s desire not to torture is to beat the odd of A getting tortured as well. This weighs out the gain and the pain in one scenario over the other. It is understandable on how this can be objective if the reason for A not to torture is to save D and E’s life that will eventually have a benefit in the world. However, by doing so, does not assure that it will be a benefit to others or to D and E.
In Nagel’s argument about objective reasons, he is not quite consistent and clear about how it is possible that all reasons are objective reasons. According to the examples shown above, it is clear that there are things to consider, such as one’s feelings about the situation, for us to find an objective counterpart in subjective reasons. However, with regards to consistency, finding reasons for one to have a subjective counterpart varies. The first two examples regarding keeping a promise, and spending time with their family and friends their objective counterpart depends on how the individual feels about the situation. It must be that their reason is motivated by something that is independent of their self-interests. This is not always the case for these scenarios, this is why it is vague what the objective counterpart is or if there is objectivity present if one originally has interest in the situation.
Lastly, considering the last two examples given, it has something to do with weighing which one would give myself pain or gain. It is subjective to choose something, such as winning in a competition, that would give me gain. However, Nagel suggests that its objective counterpart must be that we would have to suppress our desire to win, but this may not be appropriate because it would inflict pain on myself. Although it would cause gain on someone else, my own self interests and gain should come first before another’s. In regards to the torture example, weighing what inflicts more gain upon themselves is what is appropriate to choose. Although I may not benefit from something that I did right now, as long as I know, if something bad happens I would be saved from that situation, I would act upon it. Nagel needs to consider the idea of the importance of one person’s desires, and gain.
Lastly, the reason A has not to torture B as a way of preventing C’s torture of D and E. This is similar to the idea of freeing the slaves. Being a slave is terrible, and abolishing it would give the certainty that if I would end up on the bottom, things will still be good for me since I can’t be a slave anymore. This is the principle of maximizing. This is very subjective because it act upon our interest of making sure that if the worst happens, we would try as much as possible for the things to be good. With regards to the earlier reason, if A’s reason not to torture B is to prevent D and E’s torture, it is subjective as long as A’s desire not to torture is to beat the odd of A getting tortured as well. This weighs out the gain and the pain in one scenario over the other. It is understandable on how this can be objective if the reason for A not to torture is to save D and E’s life that will eventually have a benefit in the world. However, by doing so, does not assure that it will be a benefit to others or to D and E.
In Nagel’s argument about objective reasons, he is not quite consistent and clear about how it is possible that all reasons are objective reasons. According to the examples shown above, it is clear that there are things to consider, such as one’s feelings about the situation, for us to find an objective counterpart in subjective reasons. However, with regards to consistency, finding reasons for one to have a subjective counterpart varies. The first two examples regarding keeping a promise, and spending time with their family and friends their objective counterpart depends on how the individual feels about the situation. It must be that their reason is motivated by something that is independent of their self-interests. This is not always the case for these scenarios, this is why it is vague what the objective counterpart is or if there is objectivity present if one originally has interest in the situation.
Lastly, considering the last two examples given, it has something to do with weighing which one would give myself pain or gain. It is subjective to choose something, such as winning in a competition, that would give me gain. However, Nagel suggests that its objective counterpart must be that we would have to suppress our desire to win, but this may not be appropriate because it would inflict pain on myself. Although it would cause gain on someone else, my own self interests and gain should come first before another’s. In regards to the torture example, weighing what inflicts more gain upon themselves is what is appropriate to choose. Although I may not benefit from something that I did right now, as long as I know, if something bad happens I would be saved from that situation, I would act upon it. Nagel needs to consider the idea of the importance of one person’s desires, and gain.
